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Richard Gary Thomas* and Fred D. Wilshusen**
HIS Article represents the first annual review dedicated to the subject
of construction law. Construction law has crystallized in recent
years as a distinct substantive area best exemplified by the creation of
a Construction Law Section by the Texas Bar Association. Notwithstanding
this new sense of identity, the field of construction law continues to draw
from and cross into a wide number of other substantive areas. The most
obvious ones include: (1) general contract law pertaining to building and
construction contract clauses; (2) mechanics and material suppliers lien
laws; (3) surety law pertaining to bonded construction projects; and (4) the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Some areas that may not be readily appar-
ent to the practitioner who only occasionally handles construction matters
include: (1) bad faith litigation arising from third party bond claims denied
by sureties; (2) indemnity law governing indemnity clauses in construction
contracts; and (3) arbitration law controlling construction disputes.
This Article separates the significant aspects of construction law into two
broad categories. Part I analyzes the recent common law developments.
Part II examines the statutory developments, particularly the substantial leg-
islative changes in the state laws. The most significant changes will be high-
lighted and their potential implications discussed.
I. COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENTS
A. Contracts
Construction contracts contain clauses unique to the construction indus-
try. Most construction contracts explicitly exclude extra work outside the
scope of the contract. A construction contract, however, may be modified
by a written change order expressly stating an agreed price for such work.
Much construction litigation involves disputes about extra work that has not
been documented in a written change order but that has, in fact, been
performed.
In Uhlir v. Golden Triangle Development Corp. 1 the court examined the
following contractual language:
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The Contractor shall perform all the Work required by the Contract
Documents for .... Construction and completion of the home at said
address in conformance with plans and specifications attached. Any
changes to said plans and specifications after the effective date of this
contract shall be in writing with charges determined prior to making
changes.2
At issue was extra work that the contractor had performed without the writ-
ten agreement required by the contract. The court held that the contractor
should recover for the additional work based upon quantum meruit;3 the
lack of written agreements did not defeat the claim.4
General contracts commonly specify the necessary insurance coverage and
retain for the owner a degree of control over the storage of materials on the
job site as well as the completion time for the job. Pollard v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad Co. 5 illustrates the risks to an owner who retains even this modest
amount of contractual control over the contractor. Pollard worked for a
general contractor hired by Missouri Pacific (MOPAC) to remove poles and
wires from one of MOPAC's right-of-ways. After being injured, Pollard
sued MOPAC. The trial court granted summary judgment to MOPAC on
the basis that MOPAC had not exercised control over the general contrac-
tor's actions under the contract.6 Reversing the trial court summary judg-
ment, the Texas Supreme Court held that MOPAC was potentially liable
despite exercising no actual control over the contractor, because it contrac-
tually retained the right to control the contractor. 7 The minimal rights re-
served in the general contract created for the owner a duty of care to
Pollard.8
Pollard also asserted that MOPAC had an affirmative obligation to inves-
tigate the general contractor's safety history and work experience prior to
entering into the contract. Accordingly, Pollard alleged that MOPAC
breached its duty by hiring "an inexperienced contractor without inquiring
into his experience and safety record." 9 The court impliedly held that such a
duty exists by ruling that the allegations constituted sufficient grounds for
reversal of summary judgment.' 0
A typical clause in subcontract agreements authorizes the general contrac-
tor to withhold payments from the subcontractor until the subcontractor has
paid its suppliers and sub-subcontractors for their work and materials and
has provided the general contractor with appropriate releases of liens evi-
dencing such payments. In Economy Forms Corp. v. Williams Bros. Con-
2. Id. at 515.
3. Id. at 517.
4. The court also held that the requirement for a written change order for extra work can
be waived. Here, the contractor did not plead or prove nor was there a jury finding on waiver.
Hence, the contractor could not recover on that theory. Id
5. 759 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1988).
6. Id at 671.
7. Id.





struction Co.II a party supplying concrete-forming equipment to the
subcontractor claimed such a provision created a third-party beneficiary
contract right to the withheld funds in favor of the supplier. The traditional
rule in Texas denies a third-party beneficiary rights of third-party claimants
to retained funds.12 The claimant in this case, however, contended that the
retention provision in the subcontract covering any claims against the sub-
contractor established the intent of the parties to create a third-party benefi-
ciary right. The court rejected this argument and concluded that the
retention provision did not demonstrate an intent to benefit the supplier;
rather, the language showed an intent to protect the general contractor from
claims by third parties.13
Often, construction contracts will provide for performance by a contractor
to the satisfaction of the other party. In Cranetex, Inc. v. Precision Crane &
Rigging of Houston, Inc.14 The court held that a party must act in good
faith when a contract clause provides for performance to the satisfaction of
one of the parties; courts will measure dissatisfaction by an objective stan-
dard of whether the performance would satisfy a reasonable person. 15 Inter-
estingly, the Cranetex trial court made no express fact finding concerning
good faith or whether the work performed would have satisfied a reasonable
person. The appellate court, nevertheless, ruled as a matter of law that the
trial court finding that the work was substantially complete was tantamount
to a finding that the repairs met the reasonable person standard.1 6
B. Substantial Performance
Generally, a party to a contract cannot recover damages for its breach
unless that party shows that it has performed, or that it has offered to per-
form and was able to do so. The doctrine of substantial performance oper-
ates as an exception to this rule.
Uhlir v. Golden Triangle Development Corp. 17 serves as a good example of
the substantial performance rule. The contractor sought payment for labor
and materials pursuant to a construction contract. The owner argued that
the contractor had failed to meet conditions precedent because the contract
provided for final payment only "when the Work has been completed, the
Contract fully performed, and a final Certificate for Payment has been issued
by the Architect."18 The trial court found that while the contractor did not
fully and completely perform all of the work stipulated in the contract, the
contractor had substantially completed the contract. The owner-defendant
11. 754 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
12. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust v. Smith, 525 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex. 1975); Economy
Forms Corp., 754 S.W.2d at 456, Scarborough v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 250 S.W.2d 918,
922 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd).
13. 754 S.W.2d at 456.
14. 760 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
15. Id at 301-02.
16. Id at 302.
17. 763 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
18. Id at 515.
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argued that failure of the contractor to fully perform as expressly required
by the contract precluded the contractor from recovery. Rejecting this argu-
ment, the appellate court held that "[a] finding that a contract has been
substantially completed is the legal equivalent of full compliance, less any
offsets for remediable defects." 19 The court added that the lack of an archi-
tect's certificate likewise will not prevent recovery on a theory of substantial
performance. 20
The doctrine of substantial performance allows a contractor to recover the
full performance price on the contract less the cost of remedying repairable
defects. 21 The burden is upon the contractor to plead and prove the proper
measure of deductions and expenses necessary to remedy the defects, devia-
tions, and omissions.22 This burden forces the claimant-contractor to prove
inconsistent theories at trial if the contractor has pled full performance, and
in the alternative, substantial performance. The contractor would have to
provide evidence of full performance as well as evidence of expenses neces-
sary to remedy defects. Nevertheless, failure by the contractor to introduce
evidence of expenses necessary to remedy defects places the contractor in
extreme risk of not making a prima facie case for substantial performance. 23
In Uhlir the court held that a pleading of full performance of the construc-
tion contract will support the submission of an issue to the jury on its sub-
stantial performance.24 This holding is apparently contrary to Carr v.
Norstok Building Systems, Inc.25 In Carr the contractor sued the owner and
pled full performance but not substantial performance. 26 When the owner
cross-claimed against the contractor alleging defective workmanship and
materials, the contractor brought third-party actions against subcontractors
who supposedly performed the work that was the subject of the owner's
cross-claim. The court's opinion implies that the subcontractors introduced
evidence of the contractor's substantial performance27 and that the owner
introduced evidence concerning defects and expenses necessary to cure
them.28 Nevertheless, the court ruled against the contractor holding that
19. Id
20. Id.
21. Id. at 514.
22. Carr v. Norstok Bldg. Sys., Inc., 767 S.W.2d 936, 940 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989,
no writ).
23. Ido
24. 763 S.W.2d at 514.
25. 767 S.W.2d 936 (rex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ).
26. Id. at 939.
27. The court held that certain evidence adduced by the subcontractor/third-party de-
fendants could not inure to the benefit of the plaintiff/contractor because the subcontractors
were not parties to the general contract. Id at 942. The court ruled that the limited scope of
admissability of evidence from parties other than the plaintiff/contractor precluded proof of
substantial performance. Id. Hence, one must deduce that the subcontractors introduced evi-
dence that was supportive of substantial performance by the contractor.
28. The owner introduced evidence to prove credits, deductions, and offsets in an effort to
avoid payment of the full contract price. The court concluded that this evidence was offered to
rebut the contractor's contention that the contract had been fully performed, thereby limiting
its scope of admissability. Id. at 944. Because the court ruled that no evidence supported
substantial performance due to the limited scope of admissability of certain evidence from
parties other than the contractor, one must conclude that the evidence of the owner and sub-
[Vol. 44
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neither the pleading nor the evidence supported the trial court's finding that
the contractor had substantially performed its contract.29 Construction at-
torneys should thus be forewarned that such inadequacies in pleading and
proving a contractor's performance risks the same fate as that suffered by the
contractor in Carr.
To avoid this risk, the contractor should plead full performance and, in
the alternative, substantial performance. The contractor's case-in-chief
should include evidence of the expense to remedy any defect alleged by the
defendant. The Uhlir decision is instructive on how to submit both theories
in the jury charge.30
The owner in the Uhlir case also argued entitlement to recover attorneys'
fees for its cross-claim based upon breach of contract. The owner premised
its breach of contract claim upon the defects found by the jury that sup-
ported the contractor's action for substantial performance. The court held
that the evidence of offsets for incomplete or defective work that the contrac-
tor must present to make a prima facie case for substantial performance does
not justify an award of attorneys' fees against the contractor on the owner's
breach of contract claim.31
C. Indemnity
Parties to construction contracts frequently define liability for personal
injuries and property damage occurring during the construction process in
an indemnity clause. Such an indemnity clause is sometimes known in the
industry as a hold-harmless clause. Drafters of indemnity clauses in con-
struction contracts should be acutely aware of the express negligence doc-
trine requiring a party seeking indemnity from the consequences of its own
negligence to express that intent in specific terms32
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Petroleum Personnel, Inc.3 3 involved a personal
injury claim by a contractor's employee against the owner. The court held
that the following indemnity provision in the construction contract met the
express negligence test and allowed indemnity by the owner against the
contractors would have been sufficient to support a substantial performance finding if that
evidence had been considered for all purposes.
29. Id at 940, 944-45.
30. 763 S.W.2d at 514 (substantial performance jury question was submitted condition-
ally). Uhlir also provides a good definition of substantial performance for a residential con-
struction case:
The term, "substantial completion," as used in this charge, means that the im-
provements contemplated in the construction agreement must be so completed
that the premises is capable of being utilized for its intended purposes as a home
even though there may be incompleted aspects of the construction. The term,
"substantial completion," contemplates a degree of completeness such that a
reasonable person would be willing and able to make their home in the building.
The term does not require that every aspect of the construction contract be fully
completed.
31. Id at 517.
32. Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. 1987) (replacing the less
strict clear and unequivocal rule stated in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard
Ins. Co., 490 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. 1972)).




CONTRACTOR [PPI] agrees to hold harmless and unconditionally in-
demnify COMPANY [ARCO] against and for all liability, cost, ex-
penses, claims and damages which [ARCO] may at any time suffer or
sustain or become liable for by reason of any accidents, damages or
injuries either to the persons or property or both, of [PPI], or of the
workmen of either party, or of any other parties, or to the property of
[ARCO], in any matter arising from the work performed hereunder,
including but not limited to any negligent act or omission of [ARCO],
its officers, agents or employees . ...35
The court thus rejected the employee's contention that the express negli-
gence test requires specification of the kind, character, or degree of negli-
gence that is to be indemnified in the clause.36
In Monsanto Co. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. 37 an employee of the
subcontractor, Owens-Coming, brought a personal injury claim against the
general contractor, Monsanto. As the employee had collected worker's
compensation from Owen-Coming's insurance carrier, Monsanto could not
seek indemnity against Owens-Corning absent a conttactual indemnity pro-
vision. The indemnity provision in Monsanto's subcontract with Owens-
Corning stated:
Contractor agrees to indemnify and save Monsanto and its employees
harmless against any and all liabilities, penalties, demands, claims,
causes of action, suits, losses, damages, costs and expenses (including
costs of defense, settlement and reasonable attorneys' fees) which any or
all of them may hereafter suffer, incur, be responsible for or pay out...
as a result of bodily injuries.., to any person or damage... to any
property occurring to or caused in whole or in part by, Contractor (or
any of his employees), any of his Subcontractors (or any employee
thereof), or any person, firm or corporation (or any employee thereof)
directly or indirectly employed or engaged by either Contractor or any
of his Subcontractors. 38
The court held that this hold-harmless clause did not support Monsanto's
indemnity suit against Owens-Coming because it does not qualify under the
express negligence doctrine without including the term "negligence." 39
A curious development in the express negligence doctrine occurred in
Continental Steel Co. v. HA. Lott, Inc.40 Continental, the subcontractor,
appealed from a judgment in favor of Lott, the general contractor, indemni-
fying Lott for attorneys' fees generated in successfully defending against a
personal injury claim based on negligence brought by one of Continental's
employees. Continental contended that the indemnity provision in its con-
tract with Lott did not meet the requirements of the express negligence doc-
34. Ia at 726.
35. Id. at 724 (emphasis added by court).
36. Id. at 726.
37. 764 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1988, no writ).
38. Id at 295.
39. Id.
40. 772 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
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trine and therefore did not authorize indemnity for attorneys' fees expended
in defending against a claim asserting Lott's negligence. The appellate court
rejected Continental's argument because the jury found Lott was not negli-
gent, thereby rendering the express negligence doctrine inapplicable. 41 The
majority therefore required Continental to pay Lott's attorneys' fees for de-
fending against a negligence suit in which Continental presumably would
not have had to pay either attorneys' fees or damages had Lott been found
negligent. 42 The dissent points out the similarity between indemnity and
insurance contracts, noting that if an insurance policy excludes coverage for
a particular claim, it also excludes any coverage for the cost of defending
against such claims.43 The better reasoned approach is to hold that when an
indemnity provision does not meet the express negligence doctrine it does
not allow for a recovery of attorneys' fees for defending successfully against
a negligence claim.
Construction contracts'are not the only types of agreements involving in-
demnification. The complexity of commercial construction and the large
number of parties involved in construction litigation produces partial settle-
ments with some litigants and not others. Often, these partial settlements
involve agreements to indemnify one of the parties. Attorneys should care-
fully draft such settlement agreements considering the requirements of the
express negligence doctrine and avoiding all outstanding liability to non-par-
ticipating defendants.
In Manhattan Construction Co. v. Hood Lanco, Inc. 4 the plaintiff sued the
contractor for flooding caused by construction on an adjoining land owner's
tract. The contractor settled with the plaintiff and received an indemnity
agreement against anyone "claiming by, through or under [the plaintiff]." 45
The codefendant, the adjoining landowner who had hired the contractor,
cross-claimed against the contractor under a provision in the general con-
tract whereby the contractor indemnified the owner against any damage or
injury claim. The contractor sued the plaintiff under the settlement indem-
nity provision to indemnify him from the cross-claim. The court rejected the
contractor's argument concluding that the cross-claim was not by, through
or under the plaintiff.46 Hence, the court granted summary judgment against
the general contractor.47
D. Mechanics and Material Suppliers Lien and Bond Claims
Gill Savings Association v. International Supply Co., Inc. addresses several
propositions regarding lien claims.48 First, the Gill case validated a lien affi-
davit signed by Gill's attorney who lacked personal knowledge of the facts
41. Id. at 516.
42. Id at 517.
43. Id. at 523.
44. 762 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
45. Id. at 619.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 759 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. App.-Dalas 1988, writ denied).
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stated therein.49 The better practice is to obtain the signature of someone
who has personal knowledge of the claim and who is connected with the
claimant itself. Occasionally, a construction attorney may face time and dis-
tance limitations that preclude obtaining such signature on the affidavit by
the filing deadline. To prevent the loss of valuable rights, counsel may rely
upon this ruling and sign the affidavit to meet the filing deadline. This prac-
tice should be used sparingly and only when absolutely necessary to preserve
valuable rights. When counsel has signed the lien affidavit, he may want to
consider filing at the earliest possible date a corrected or supplemental affida-
vit signed by one with personal knowledge of the facts.
Second, the opinion in Gill addresses the problem presented when a lien
affidavit overstates the amount of the claim. At the time lien affidavits are
filed, it is often difficult to establish with precision the exact amount due for
the claimant's labor and materials. In addition to routine accounting errors,
the value of extra work outside the scope of the contract and offsets or
backcharges for incomplete or poor quality work often are not conclusively
determined until a trial on the merits. If the fact finder concludes that the
amount of the claim is less than the amount stated in the lien affidavit the
Gill court strongly suggests that such discrepancy does not invalidate the
entire lien.50 The lien affidavit in Gill stated that Gill Savings Association
currently owed $75,986.03. At trial, the lien claimant's representative ad-
mitted that the amount shown in the lien affidavit was incorrect and that the
correct amount due was $57,365.32. The court held, that under the facts of
the case, the lien affidavit was in substantial compliance with the property
code.51 Therefore, the discrepancy between the amount claimed in the lien
affidavit and the lien claimant's evidence did not invalidate the lien.
Gill also reasserted an important procedural requirement for a defendant
to raise successfully an improper notice defense. Pursuant to the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure5 2 a plaintiff who pleads that all conditions prece-
dent have been met to perfect a lien claim need not prove the intricate notice
deadline requirements to establish his prima facie case unless and until the
defendant specifically denies timely or proper notice. In Gill the defendants
failed to deny specifically inadequacy of notice and, therefore, certain
amounts of the lien that apparently were claimed untimely were validated.5 3
The primary issue in Occidental Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. East
End Glass Co.5 4 was whether the claimant gave adequate notice of its intent
to file a lien. The claimant sent its notice to the contractor rather than to the
actual owner of the property. The court found that the claimant's notice
49. Id. at 699.
50. Id. at 700.
51. (Citing TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.054(a)(1) (Vernon 1984), requiring claimant in
lien foreclosure action to file sworn affidavit that includes amount of outstanding debt).
52. TEx. R. Civ. P. 54.
53. 759 S.W.2d at 701; see also, BC & S Constr., Inc. v. Action Elec. Co., 753 S.W.2d
841, 842 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ) (noting that Tex. R. Civ. P. 54 allows claim-
ant to aver generally that all conditions precedent occurred; claimant need only prove those
conditions precedent that respondent specifically denies were performed).
54, 773 S.W.2d 687 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
[Vol. 44
CONSTRUCTION LAW
substantially complied with the notice requirements of the statute. 5" The
court gave several reasons for its decision: the same individuals were in-
volved in an interlocking relationship between the contractor and the owner,
the owner and the contractor were listed at the same address, and the con-
struction deed of trust indicated the same address for the owner and the
notice delivery.5 6
The Occidental court also identified two important factors applicable to
less clear cases involving the issue of substantial compliance with property
code requirements. First, the court observed that the purpose of the notice
was to allow the owner self-protection by withholding funds from the con-
tractor.5 7 That purpose was not defeated in this case because the owner
defaulted not only on its payment to the claimant, but also on its payments
to the lender. Apparently, the court relied upon the owner's inability to
make payments as evidence that the notice would have been futile; the court
thus willingly relaxed statutory notice requirements.5" Second, the court
held that the owner actually received written notice and therefore the
method of delivery was immaterial. 59 Significantly the court does not recite
any evidence to reflect actual delivery of the notice to the owner. The court
could have more properly ieached the same result by invoking the sham
contract provisions in the property codeO that authorize the court to ignore
a sham entity standing between the owner and second-tier claimants.
The scope of a mechanic's lien can be the subject of a construction dis-
pute. In H.B. Zachry Co. v. Wallercreek, Ltd. (In re Waller Creek Ltd.)61
the court considered whether the perfection of a mechanic's lien on a park-
ing garage extended to a hotel that had been constructed on top of the park-
ing garage. The garage and the hotel were constructed independently under
separate contracts. The court perceived the legal issue to be whether simply
by negotiating separate contracts for different segments of the final com-
pleted project can limit a mechanic's lien.62
The court held that the parking garage lien did not extend to the hotel,63
basing its ruling upon Lyon v. Logan,64 which held that the owner controls
the scope of a mechanic's lien. The Waller Creek court reasoned that the
contractor could not have been deceived regarding the scope of its lien on
the garage because the parties treated the garage and hotel construction con-
tracts as separate and distinct projects. 65 Hence, if the legal structure of a
55. Id. at 689 (rEx. PROP. CODE AN. § 53.003(d) satisfied by actual receipt of notice
regardless of method of delivery).
56. IJd at 688.
57. Id at 688.
58. Id. at 688-89.
59. Id. at 689 (court relying on Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 53.0031d) (Vernon 1984)).
60. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.026 (Vernon 1984) amended by TEx. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 53 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
61. 867 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1989).
62. Id. at 235.
63. Id. at 236.
64. 68 Tex. 521, 5 S.W. 72 (1887).
65. 867 F.2d at 235.
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total project involves multiple and distinct construction contracts, the scope
of the mechanic's liens are limited to the real property covered by each
contract.
The contract limitation principle will likely apply to second tier claimants
as well. Subcontractors and material suppliers on the project, however, may
not possess the same degree of knowledge as the general contractor regard-
ing the legal structure of the construction contracts. The danger of decep-
tion as to the scope of their mechanic's lien is greater than existed for the
general contractor in the Waller Creek case. If deception is possible, a court
may conclude that the scope of the lien is not limited by the terms of a single
contract.
The use of construction bonds on commercial construction projects is
commonplace. Contractors frequently employ payment bonds and perform-
ance bonds on both private and public projects. For publicly owned projects
involving the state of Texas, performance and payment bonds are statutorily
required when the prime contract exceeds $25,000.66 Payment bonds are
also statutorily authorized for privately owned construction projects.67
Likewise, when a claimant on a privately owned construction project at-
tempts to fix a mechanic's and materialman's lien, the owner may obtain a
bond to indemnify against the lien pursuant to specific provisions of the
property code.68
The authorizing statutes contain specific bond requirements. 69 In Sheldon
Pollack Corp. v. Pioneer Concrete, Inc. 70 the general contractor-defendant
posted a bond to indemnify against a mechanic's lien. The contractor in-
tended to comply with the requirements of the statute, but the bond con-
tained a limitation of liability that was not included in the statute.7' The
court refused to enforce the limitation of liability because it exceeded the
limitations expressed in the statute.72
E. Condominiums
In Burton v. Cravey73 the court held that dissident condominium owners
have full access to condominium records and the association's attorney's
records. 4 A liberal view of such discovery in many condominium construc-
tion cases can radically undermine the attorney-client privilege. For exam-
ple, typical condominium construction cases involve design and construction
66. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5160A (Vernon Supp. 1990).
67. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN § 53.201 (Vernon 1984).
68. Id §§ 53.171-.174 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1990).
69. Id. § 53.172 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (payment bonds on privately owned projects); Id§ 53.202 (bonds to indemnify on privately owned projects); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5160A (Vernon Supp. 1990) (publicly owned projects with the State of Texas).
70. 765 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
71. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN., § 53.171 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1990).
72. (Citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.171 (Vernon 1984), amended by 765 S.W. 2d at
846 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.172 (Vernon Supp. 1990)).
73. 759 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
74. Id. at 161-62. The court relied on TEx. PROP. CODE ANN.§ 81.209 (Vernon 1984)
and TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-2.23 (Vernon 1980).
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disputes against the original development-owner and delinquency cases for
nonpayment of assessment fees against the owner. The developer-owner
who still owns one or more condominium units or the condominium owner
being sued for delinquent payment may thus possess the right to inspect
traditionally privileged attorney's records of the condominium association
bringing suit against them. Hopefully, courts will not apply this rule in a
way that discourages free and frank exchanges of information and ideas be-
tween attorneys and their clients, especially during adversary proceedings.
F. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The complexity of construction projects, the degree of cooperation re-
quired for their successful completion, and the frequent issuance of payment
bonds by sureties has quickly brought the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing to the forefront of construction litigation. In City of San Antonio v.
Forgj 75 the general contractor sued the city for breaching the duty of good
faith and fair dealing and for failing to pay some $400,000 in repair costs on
a water well whose metal casing had ruptured while being set. Relying on
English v. Fischer76 the Forgy court examined whether the special relation-
ship necessary to find an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
arose from either the element of trust essential to accomplish the goals of the
contractual undertaking or an imbalance in bargaining power.77
The city engineers in Forgy, following the pre-bid conference, made calcu-
lations that revealed the vulnerability of the casing to collapse if constructed
as designed. The general contractor contended that the city's failure to warn
him of its discovery of the flaw in the casing design constituted a breach of
trust within the special relationship between the parties. The court rejected
the general contractor's argument because the contract obligated the general
contractor to examine the specs and to accept sole responsibility for the
"'safety, adequacy and efficiency of his plant, equipment and methods' ".78
The court thus held that the city's failure to warn did not give rise to a claim
for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, but only created the
possibility of a negligence claim.79
The court also held that an imbalance in bargaining power, one element of
a claim for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, "is limited to
an imbalance of bargaining power conferred upon the parties by the terms of
the contract with respect to performance or enforcement and not with re-
spect to original formation of the contract."80 The court therefore also de-
nied the claim on the basis of an imbalance of bargaining power because
"[t]he record fails to reveal any evidence or provision of the contract which
gave the City the right or opportunity, with little or no injury to itself, to
75. 769 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
76. 660 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tex. 1983).
77. 769 S.W.2d at 296.





take advantage of Mr. Forgy's want of information or diligence, lack of re-
sources or inability to protect his own interests.""1 Essentially, because the
contract gave Forgy the opportunity to protect himself, no imbalance in bar-
gaining pbwer apparently existed.
G. Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
Two significant construction dispute cases occurred under the Deceptive
Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA)82 during the survey pe-
riod. In Ludt v. McCollum, 83 a case involving damages to a building, the
court specifically held that a DTPA claimant can recover both the cost of
repairs and the amount of reduction in the building's value without ob-
taining a double recovery if the damages question specifically limits the
amount of reduction in value to a period after repairs have been com-
pleted 84 In Eckman v. Centennial Savings Bank,85 a case in which a real
estate development group sued a bank for failing to provide financing as
represented, the court established the procedural rules for applying the $25
million assets exception to business consumer status. Specifically, the court
held that the defendant must raise the issue through a special exception and
request an in-camera inspection of the evidence relating to the plaintiff's
assets. 86 If the court determines that a genuine issue of material fact exists,
then the plaintiff must prove to the fact finder that it does not fall within the
exception.87
H. Insurance
Contractors routinely carry comprehensive general liability coverage. In
Gar-Tex Construction Co. v. Employers Casualty Co.88 the court examined
the liability of the insurance carrier on a comprehensive general liability pol-
icy. Gar-Tex, the subcontractor who constructed an underground concrete
water storage tank, was responsible for protecting the tank against water
damage while construction was in progress. During a heavy rain, pumps
installed to keep the excavation site dry failed to prevent accumulation of
water which damaged the tank forcing repairs of approximately $50,000.
The court upheld a summary judgment that barred Gar-Tex's claim as a
matter of law under a faulty workmanship exclusionary provision in the lia-
bility policy.89 The court essentially interpreted Gar-Tex's contract obliga-
tion to keep the excavation site dry as an absolute requirement of
performance; any failure to keep the site dry thus equated to faulty work-
manship as a matter of law. If the court had not viewed the specification as
81. Id at 298.
82. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 1987).
83. 762 S.W.2d 575 (rex. 1988).
84. Id. at 576.
85. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 46 (October 26, 1988) (motion for rehearing pending).
86. Id at 47-48.
87. Id at 48.
88. 771 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. App.-Dalas 1989, writ denied).
89. Id at 643.
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creating absolute performance obligations for the contractor but rather as
creating a duty to perform in a good and workmanlike manner, the court
would have probably found a question of material fact rendering the sum-
mary judgment improper.
The Court agreed that Gar-Tex's alternative argument that defective work
performed by it causing damage to other nondefective Gar-Tex work would
not exclude coverage for the latter under the faulty workmanship provision
of the insurance policy.90 The court found, however, that the water pumps
which failed could not be considered divisible from the damaged water
tank.91 Therefore, the damage was not to other nondefective work; rather,
to the entire job, thereby relieving the insurer of liability for any damage
caused by Gar-Tex's faulty workmanship. 92
I. Statute of Repose
Johnson v. City of Fort Worth 93 raised the question of whether the ten year
statute of repose 94 regarding design claims applies to claims by a city. The
city sued the architects of a city water park for contribution to damages
arising out of injuries to a park visitor. The city contended that the pub-
lisher of the codified statute of repose inadvertently omitted a provision that
excluded the application of the statute to the city and thereby substantively
changed the law. The court rejected this argument as it was based on the
unofficial actions of the publisher and thus held that the statute of repose
does apply to cities.95
J. Arbitration
In Wylie Independent School District v. TMC Foundations, Inc. 96 the court
significantly extended the common law of arbitration. It enforced an other-
wise unenforceable arbitration clause under the common law by holding that
"an agreement to arbitrate future contractual disputes is specifically enforce-
able even in the face of one party's attempted revocation of that agreement
prior to an arbitration award." 97 This decision is less significant than it
would have been a few years ago; the legislature removed the greatest stum-
bling block to the enforcement of arbitration agreements under statute by
eliminating a technical notice requirement.9 Nonetheless, the new law only
90. Id
91. Id at 644.
92. Id
93. 774 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. 1989).
94. TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.008 (Vernon 1986) (providing ten-year
statute of limitation from date of substantial completion or initial operation of facility or equip-
ment in suit against architect or engineer).
95. 744 S.W.2d at 655.
96. 770 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. App.-Dalas 1989, no writ).
97. Id at 23.
98. See TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. § 224-1 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (removing provision
providing arbitration agreement would not be enforced unless contract contained prominent
notice of arbitration on its first page).
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applies to contracts effective on or after August 31, 1987,99 and the extension
of the common law of arbitration will substantially impact contracts entered
prior to that date.
Counsel should note that an enforceable arbitration right can be waived.
In Bramcon General Contractors, Inc. v. Wigley Construction Co., °0 the gen-
eral contractor, Bramcon, delayed moving to compel arbitration of its dis-
putes with its subcontractor, Wigley, until after Wigley had filed a motion
for summary judgment. The court found that, among other things, the fol-
lowing actions by Bramcon constituted a waiver of its right to arbitration:
filing an answer; failing to plead the arbitration clause in its answer; allowing
Wigley to request a trial date before requesting arbitration; and allowing
Wigley to file a motion for summary judgment before requesting
arbitration. 101
II. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS
The Seventy-First Texas Legislature enacted substantial revisions to the
mechanic's lien and construction bond laws. 102 The changes encompass
housekeeping changes effecting greater clarity in the meaning of the statutes
as well as substantive changes substantially altering rights under the former
statute. Highlights of the amendments will be discussed.
A. Effective Date
Because the recent changes to the mechanic's lien and construction bond
laws restrict the time limits for perfecting claims and the statute of limita-
tions for suing on claims, whether a claim is governed by the old law or by
the revised law affects its validity. The changes take effect September 1,
1989.103 The revised law applies "only to matters relating to an original
contract that is entered into on or after the effective date of this Act." 1 4
This provision may create difficulties for some parties. Lower tier contrac-
tors or suppliers will not necessarily have immediate access to information
regarding the date that the parties entered into the original contract, thereby
creating uncertainty as to which law applies. Additionally, when a general
contract is oral, parties will encounter more difficulty in ascertaining the
date it became enforceable.
The effective date of the revised law also means that the old law will not
quickly fall into disuse. With the substantial duration of larger construction
projects, lien or bond claims may be governed by the old law up to several
years in the future.
99. Id.
100. 774 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ).
101. Id at 827.
102. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1138, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4693.
103. Id § 41, at 4707.
104. Id. § 40, at 4707. The act further states: "Matters relating to an original contract that
is entered into before that date [September 1, 1989] are governed by the law as it existed on the




B. Architects, Engineers or Surveyors
The statutory revision added a new provision entitling an architect, engi-
neer, or surveyor to a lien for preparation of plans or plats in connection
with proposed construction or repair of improvements on real property.10 5
Most significantly, this provision apparently allows design professionals to
claim a lien under certain conditions for work despite no on-site supervi-
sion.106 Inexplicably, the legislature not only passed this revision in the
comprehensive amendments to the lien and bond laws but also included a
similar provision in a separate act, 107 which provides for a different manner
for determining which work the revised law affects.10 8 The separate act ap-
plies to "contracts executed by an architect, engineer, or surveyor on or after
the effective date [September 1, 1989] of this Act." 109 In attempting to show
the applicability of the new law, the design professional presumably can
therefore look to the date of its contract for preparatory design work.
Traditionally, liens, regardless of when the work was performed, had their
inception at some common time at the beginning of the project. 110 The in-
ception date determines the priority between mechanic's liens and other
competing liens."1 Allowing lien claims for pre-construction design work
raises the question of whether the inception date for all liens is now moved
back to a time prior to the commencement of actual construction. The revi-
sions, however, provide that the design professional's work will not affect the
inception date of any lien and will be governed by the same provisions 12
regarding the inception of other liens. 113
C. Filing of the Affidavit of Lien
Another significant revision under the new law alters the filing deadline
105. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.021(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
106. Prior to the adoption of this provision, the trend in Texas had been to require an
architect to perform on-site supervisory work before claiming a lien. See, eg., Branecky v.
Seaman, 688 S.W.2d 117, 120 (rex. App.--Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lancaster v.
McKenzie, 439 S.W.2d 728, 729 (rex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1965, no writ). Both cases cite
Sanguinett & Staats v. Colorado Salt Co., 150 S.W. 490, 491 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1912, no writ) as precedent for the on-site supervision requirement. In Sanguinett & Statts the
court simply held that "in preparing the plans and specifications, as well as in superintending
the construction of the improvements . . . (the architect] furnished 'labor' 'to erect' those
improvements, within the meaning of our (lien] statute."
107. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.021 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
108. I& (Compare Act of June 14, 1989, Ch. 395, § 2, 1989 TEx. GEN. LAWS 1527, 1528
(applying to contracts executed by architect, engineer or surveyor on or after September 1,
1989) with Act of June 16, 1989, Ch. 1138, § 40, 1989 Tax. GEN. LAWS 4693 (applying to
matters relating to original contracts entered into on or after September 1, 1989)).
109. Id.
110. See Id. § 53.124 (Vernon 1984), amended by Id § 53.124 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (re-
pealing provision that inception of lien occurs when contract for construction executed).
I11. See TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.123(b) (Vernon 1984) (any lien, encumbrance or
mortgage on the land at the time of the inception of the mechanic's lien is not affected by the
lien).
112. See Id § 53.124 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (defining "time of inception" as "commence-
ment of construction of improvements or delivery of materials").
113. Id. § 53.021(d).
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for notices to perfect lien and bond claims as well as for the lien affidavit." 4
The general scheme under the prior law set a certain number of days for the
claimant to take the required action. 15 The time periods usually ran from
the tenth day of the month following the month in which a specified activity
took place. For example, for one other than a general contractor, 1 6 the lien
affidavit filing deadline ran from the time on which the indebtedness ac-
crued; 17 the indebtedness accrued "on the 10th day of the month following
the last month in which the labor was performed or the material
furnished." 118
Because of the varying numbers of days in different months, the deadline
for taking action under the former law never fell on a uniform day during
every month.' 9 The statutory revisions now provide that deadlines will uni-
formly fall on the fifteenth day of a month.12 0 Consistent with former law,
the amendments trigger the running of the time period for filing a lien affida-
vit from the day on which the indebtedness accrues.' 2' Although the date
on which the indebtedness accrues differs for a general contractor and other
claimants, 2 2 the statutory revisions stipulate a uniform filing date as the
fifteenth day of the fourth calendar month after the day on which indebted-
ness accrues. 23 This provision extends the filing deadline for a lien affidavit
of subcontractors and suppliers by a few days.124 Nevertheless, these addi-
tional days win mean little for subcontractors and suppliers whose lien rights
114. Id. § 53.052(a).
115. See, eg., Id. § 53.052(b), (c) (Vernon 1984), (120 days from accrual of indebtedness
for original contractor to file affidavit of lien and 90 days for other claimants to file affidavit of
lien), amended by Id. § 53.052(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
116. For purposes of this article the terms "general contractor" often will be used but
should be understood to mean "original contractor" which is the term used in the statute for
any person in a direct contractual relationship with the owner. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 53.001(7) (Vernon 1984).
117. Id. § 53.052(c) (Vernon 1984), amended by Id § 53.052(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
118. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.§ 53.053(a)(2) (Vernon 1984), amended by TEx. Id
§ 53.053(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
119. For example, if indebtedness accrued for a subcontractor during the month of Janu-
ary, the deadline for filing his lien affidavit during a leap year would be May 10th, but in a non-
leap year would be May I 1th.
120. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.052(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
121. Compare Id. § 53.052(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990) ("The person claiming the lien must file
an affidavit... not later than the 15th day of the fourth calendar month after the day on which
the indebtedness accrues.") with Id, § 53.052(b) (Vernon 1984) ("An original contractor must
file the affidavit not later than the 120th day after the day on which the indebtedness accrues.")
amended by Id. § 53.052(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
122. Compare TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.053(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990):
"Indebtedness to an original contractor accrues: (1) on the last day of the month
in which a written declaratin by the original contractor or the owner is received
by the other party to the original contract stating that the original contract has
been terminated; or (2) on the last day of the month in which the original con-
tract has been completed, finally settled, or abandoned."
with Id. § 53.053(c):
"Indebtedness to a subcontractor, or to any person not covered by Subsection
(b) or (d), who has furnished labor or material to an original contractor or to
another subcontractor accrues on the last day of the month in wich the labor
was performed or the material furnished."
123. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.052(a).
124. For example, under the prior law if indebtedness accrued for a subcontractor in Au-
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are jeopardized not by the filing deadline for the lien affidavit, but rather by
the much shorter deadlines for sending notice letters to perfect such
claims.125
D. " Contents of a Lien Affidavit
The statutory revisions now require the lien affidavit to include the claim-
ant's business address. 126 Additionally, the statute deletes the words "if
known" after the requirement that the affidavit include the name of the
owner or reputed owner. 127 Claimants must therefore now make some at-
tempt to state the name of an owner in the lien affidavit. Permitting a claim-
ant to name a reputed owner may nevertheless provide the margin of safety
necessary to protect the claimant when confusion arises regarding the actual
owner.
12 8
E. Notice of the Filed Affidavit
As with the old law, the statutory revisions require notice of the filing of
the lien affidavit to be sent to the owner.12 9 The new law, however, now
engrafts onto the notice requirement a ten-business-day deadline subsequent
to filing.130 In addition, the claimant must send a copy to the general con-
tractor within the same period. 131 An issue left unanswered is whether fail-
ure to comply with this requirement will effectively avoid liens properly
perfected in all other respects. 132
F. Notice Requirements
Perhaps the most significant practical change of the statutory revisions
was the alteration of a subcontractor's time limits for giving notice of an
intent to file a lien.133 A subcontractor under the prior law had ninety days
from the tenth day of the month following the month in which it had fur-
nished labor and material to send a notice of intent to file a lien.134 Under
the statutory revisions the subcontractor must send the notice letter by the
gust, the filing deadline for the lien affidavit would be December 9. Under the statutory revi-
sions the filing deadline would be December 15.
125. See infra Section II.F.
126. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.054(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
127. Compare IL § 53.054(a)(2) (Vernon 1984) with IM § 53.054 (a)(2) (Vernon Supp.
1990).
128. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.054(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
129. Id § 53.055.
130. Id
131. Id
132. See generally First Nat'l Bank v. Sledge, 653 S.W.2d 283, 287-88 (Tex. 1983) (subcon-
tractor who only sent one copy of affidavit rather than required two copies satisfied notice
requirement); Cabintree, Inc. v. Schneider, 728 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd) (notice of filing sent two months after last day on which affidavit could
have been filed held not to be timely).
133. Subcontractor is used to mean anyone in a direct contractual relationship with the
general contractor.
134. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.056(b)-(c) (Vernon 1984), amended by Id. § 53.056(b)-
(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
1990]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
fifteenth day of the third month following the month in which it furnished
the labor or material. 135 The effect of this amendment is to reduce the time
limit for a subcontractor to send its notice letter to the owner by approxi-
mately one month.1 36 Because the lien claim's validity depends upon the
giving of timely notice, the subcontractor must be particularly diligent to
avoid losing part or all of his lien claim under the newly reduced notice
periods.
G. Lien on a Homestead
A claimant traditionally has to meet more stringent requirements to per-
fect a lien on a homestead than on non-homestead property.1 37 The recent
statutory changes require an additional bold-faced notice at the top of the
homestead lien affidavit: "NOTICE: THIS IS NOT A LIEN. THIS IS
ONLY AN AFFIDAVIT CLAIMING A LIEN."'' 38 Not only must a
homestead lien comply with the notice requirement for any other lien, the
notices of intent to lien now must also contain a lengthy notice aimed specifi-
cally at the homestead owner.139 The failure to include this specific lan-
guage arguably voids the effect of an otherwise adequate notice letter to a
homestead owner.Y40
H Affidavits of Commencement and Completion
The statutory revisions created two concepts. The new law now allows
the owner and general contractor to fie jointly an affidavit of commence-
ment 141 and the owner alone to file an affidavit of completion. 142 Both affi-
davits constitute prima .facie evidence of their contents, namely
commencement1 43 and completion;144 both affidavits may be rebutted if they
incorrectly reflected the actual date of the respective events.' 45 The affidavit
of commencement is significant in establishing the inception of liens and
clarifies for the construction lender the date before which it must file its deed
of trust.14 6 By filing the lender's deed of trust prior to commencement of
construction, the deed of trust lender thus prevents its lien from becoming
135. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.056(b)-(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
136. For example, if the subcontractor furnished work during the month of June, the dead-
line for the notice letter would be October 8 under the old law and September 15 under the
new law.
137. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.059 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1990) (contract must be
in writing and must be signed prior to furnishing of labor or material).
138. Id. § 53.059(h) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
139. I& § 53.059(i).
140. Cf Id. § 53.056(d).
141. Id. § 53.124(c)-(d).
142. Id. § 53.106(a).
143. Id § 53.124(d).
144. Id. § 53.106(d).
145. Id. § 53.106(d) and § 53.124(d) (both affidavits constitute prima facie evidence, and
therefore, by implication may be rebutted).




subordinated to mechanic's liens.147
The affidavit of completion allows the owner to release the statutorily re-
quired ten percent retainage to the general contractor thirty days after com-
pletion.148 Once such funds are properly disbursed the claimant will no
longer have a fund against which to claim a lien.149 Claimants should there-
fore routinely send a written request for a copy of any notice of the filing of
an affidavit of completion.
I Attorney's Fees
In addition to the changes in the notice scheme o50 and the statute of limi-
tations,151 attorney's fees were changed significantly in the statutory amend-
ments. Under the old law, the jury could award attorneys' fees to prevailing
claimants;' 52 the defense could also recover attorneys' fees to a limited ex-
tent.153 The new law provides for recovery of attorneys' fees when deemed
equitable and just by the court. 154 Furthermore, prevailing defendants may
recover attorneys' fees not clearly recoverable under the former statute. 55
J. Statute of Limitations
Because the old law provided no limitations period for pursuing lien
claims, it fell under the residual limitations period allowing four years to
bring suit after the cause of action accrued.' 5 6 The statutory amendments
state an express statute of limitations requiring commencement of suits to
foreclose a mechanic's lien within two years of the filing date of the lien
affidavit or within one year after completion of the work under the original
contract, whichever is later.15 7 Reducing the statute of limitations by half
places an additional pressure on claimants to proceed with suit and creates a
greater likelihood that procedurals errors will have limitation consequences.
K Obligation to Furnish Information
The statutory revisions now require various parties involved in a construc-
tion project to provide information upon proper demand.158 Certain catego-
ries of information such as the legal description of the real property being
147. See Id. § 53.123(b) (Vernon 1984) (prior liens unaffected by mechanic's lien).
148. Id. § 53.101(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
149. See Id. § 53.105.
150. See infra Section II.F.
151. See infra Section 11.J.
152. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.156 (Vernon 1984), amended by Id. § 53.156 (Vernon
Supp. 1990).
153. IdM.
154. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.156 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
155. Id. § 53.156 (Vernon 1984), amended by Id, § 53.156 (Vernon Supp. 1990) does not
necessarily support an award of attorneys' fees to a surety defending under a statutory pay-
ment bond on privately owned projects. Nor did the old law provide attorneys' fees for a
declaratory action to invalidate a lien as is authorized by the amendments.
156. See Tax. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1986).
157. Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.158 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
158. Id § 53.159.
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improved and the name and last known address of the payment bond surety
will facilitate lower tier contractors in protecting their lien and bond
rights. 59 The owner and general contractor may also avail themselves of
this information provision. Significant information may be obtained from a
subcontractor including the names of all sub-subcontractors or suppliers fur-
nishing the subcontractor labor or materials' 6° and an estimate of the
amount due for each calendar month in which the subcontractor has pro-
vided labor or materials. 161
L. Bonds to Indemnify Against Lien
Under the old and new laws, a lien claim could be "bonded around" by
filing a bond to indemnify against a lien.162 Apparently, the old law permit-
ted the claimant to pursue simultaneously a lien claim and a claim based
upon the indemnifying bond as long as the claimant filed suit on the lien
claim within thirty days after the service of notice on the bond.163 The stat-
utory amendments, however, provide that filing a bond to indemnify dis-
charges the lien.164
M. Payment Bonds
Both the old' 65 and new166 laws specify the same notice schemes for pay-
ment-bond claims as for lien claims. Consequently, the alterations to the
notice time-table adopted by the amendments for perfecting lien claims also
affect the time-table for perfecting payment-bond claims. In addition, other
changes similar to those in the amendments regarding lien claims have also
been made regarding payment-bond claims including allowance of defensive
attorneys' fees' 67 and a reduction in the statute of limitations.1 68
N. McGregor Act
The McGregor Act 169 requires contractors to provide payment bonds for
public works projects involving the State of Texas when the general contract
is in excess of $25,000.170 The amendments to the act include the same three
significant alterations to the private lien and bond laws: (1) adopting the
same notice scheme as that under the private bond laws;17' (2) allowing, for
159. I § 53.159(a)(1)-(2).
160. Id § 53.159(c)(1).
161. Id § 53.159(d).
162. Id. §§ 53.171-53.176 (Vernon 1984), amended by Id §§ 53.171-.176 (Vernon Supp.
1990).
163. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.171(c) (Vernon 1984).
164. Id. § 53.157(4) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
165. Compare Id § 53.206 (Vernon 1984), amended by Id § 53.206 (Vernon Supp. 1990),
with Id § 53.056 (Vernon 1984), amended by Id § 53.056 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
166. Compare TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.206 (Vernon Supp. 1990) with Id § 53.056.
167. TEx. PROP CODE ANN. § 53.156.
168. Id § 53.208(d) (reduced from 14 months to one year).
169. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5160 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1990).
170. Id. art. 5160A(b).
171. Id art. 5160B(a), (b)(2).
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the first time, defensive attorneys' fees and shifting the award of attorneys'
fees to the court as it deems equitable and just;172 and (3) reducing the stat-
ute of limitations from fourteen months to one year.173 In addition, the Mc-
Gregor Act revisions create an obligation to furnish information 74
comparable to that required under the amendments to the payment bond
laws for privately owned projects. 175
One substantial gap in the original McGregor Act insulated the state from
liability even if the state failed to require the general contractor to post the
required payment bond.176 The amendments to the McGregor Act ex-
pressly provide that in the event the governmental authority fails to obtain
from the general contractor the required bond, the claimant shall have a lien
against funds "due the prime contractor in the same manner and to the same
extent as if the contract were subject to the provisions governing state public
work contracts under $25,000."177 The difficulty in applying the principles
governing state public work contracts under $25,000 to larger jobs is that
those provisions require "notice before any payment is made to the contrac-
tor." ' 7 8 To benefit from the advantages gained by this amendment, the con-
tractor must diligently determine at the beginning of the job the
nonexistence of the required bond and send the required notice to the appro-
priate public authority within the extremely short time frame allowed.
III. CONCLUSION
Although significant common law developments occurred in the field of
construction law during the survey period, the sweeping revision of the lien
and bond statutes is the most significant development in the field. What
practical consequences the revisions have and what new common law ques-
tions will arise due to these changes remains to be seen.
172. Id art. 5160H.
173. Id art. 5160G. (Under the old law the statute of limitations expired one year after suit
may be brought. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5160G (Vernon 1987). Because suit could
not be brought until the expiration of sixty days after the filing of the claim, this effectively
created a fourteen month statute of limitations, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5160B
(Vernon 1987). Limitations under the revised law, however, is one year after the filing of the
claim).
174. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 51601 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
175. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.159 (Vernon Supp. 1990). For discussion of obligation
to furnish information, see supra Section I.K.
176. See Greenville Indep. School Dist. v. B & J Excavating, Inc., 694 S.W.2d 410, 414
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
177. TaX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5160A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
178. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.234 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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